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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This court has appellate jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(h). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Issue: Does the term "residence" in the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act 
mean where a military service-member parent legally resides or where the soldier 
physically resides even if he is only there under compulsion because of military 
orders? 
Standard of Review: Statutory interpretation is a question of law. Brinkerhoffv. 
Brinkerhoff, 945 P.2d 113, 115 (Utah App. 1997). A correction of error standard 
applies. Id. No deference is given to the trial court's interpretation. Id. 
Issue Preserved: R:53-54; 91; 126-128; 168-174; 188-191; 199-214. 
2. Issue: Do Utah military service-members retain their Utah residence under the 
UIFSA even if the military deploys them to serve outside the state of Utah? 
Standard of Review: Statutory interpretation is a question of law. Brinkerhoff, 
945 P.2d at 115. A correction of error standard applies. Id. No deference is given 
to the trial court's interpretation. Id. 
Issue Preserved: R:53-54; 91; 126-128; 168-174; 188-191; 199-214. 
3. Issue: Did the court below erroneously decline subject-matter jurisdiction to 
modify the parties' registered child support order? 
Standard of Review: Jurisdiction is a question of law. Case v. Case, 2004 UT 
App 423, Tf 5, 103 P.3d 171. A correction of error standard applies. Id. No 
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deference is given to the trial court's determination. Id. 
Issue Preserved: R:53-54; 91; 126-128; 168-174; 188-191; 199-214. 
4. Issue: Did the court below exceed its discretion by ordering Husband to pay 
Wife's attorney's fees and costs? 
Standard of Review: Normally abuse of discretion. Bolliger v. Bolliger, 2000 UT 
App 47, f^ 26, 997 P.2d 903. However, a discretionary decision premised on a 
flawed legal conclusion constitutes a per se abuse of discretion, Lund v. Brown, 
2000 UT 75, If 9, 11 P.3d 277, and conclusions of law are reviewed under a 
correction of error standard without deference to the trial court's decision. See 
Brinkerhoff, 945 P.2d at 115. 
Issue Preserved: R:262-266; 318-322; 430-437. 
5. Issue: Does this court retain authority to judicially review whether the court below 
mistakenly declined jurisdiction in the first place notwithstanding California's 
subsequent issuance of a modified child support order? 
Standard of Review: Inapplicable because the court below never ruled on this 
issue. Even if it had, preclusion presents a question of law this court reviews under 
a correction of error standard without any deference to the court below. Gillmor v. 
Family Link, LLC, 2010 UT App 2, If 10, 647 Utah Adv. Rep. 3. 
Issue Preserved: R:439-532. 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Resolution of the issues presented on appeal is governed by the following 
provisions of the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (the "UIFSA"). Both California 
and Utah have adopted substantially the same version of this uniform act. 
"A tribunal of this state that has issued a child-support order consistent with the 
law of this state has and shall exercise continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify 
its child-support order if the order is the controlling order, and: 
(a) at the time of the filing of a request for modification, this state is the 
residence of the obligor, the individual obligee, or the child for whose benefit the 
support order is issued. ...". 
California Family Code § 4909 and Utah Code Ann. § 78B-14-205(l)("Section 
205") 
"If all of the parties who are individuals reside in this State and the child does not 
reside in the issuing state, a tribunal of this state has jurisdiction to enforce and to 
modify the issuing state's child support order in a proceeding to register that 
order." 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-14-613(1) and California Family Code § 4962 ("Section 
613"). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND RELEVANT FACTS 
This is a proceeding to modify a sister-state's child support order in Utah pursuant 
to the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act. The court below dismissed this case after 
concluding it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. That erroneous determination is the 
subject of this appeal. 
When reviewing a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction where the trial court relied on 
documentary evidence without conducting an evidentiary hearing, this court accepts the 
plaintiffs facts as true and resolves any disputes in plaintiffs favor. See Neways, Inc. v. 
McCausland, 950 P.2d 420,422 (Utah 1997). 
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Background on the Parties 
Appellant Aaron Lilly ("Husband") is a United States Marine from Utah. (R:53, 
138-145). Husband was born, raised, and graduated high school in Utah. (R:466). 
Husband enlisted in the Marine Corps in Utah in 1994. Id. On September 1, 2001, 
Husband married Appellee Korille Lilly ("Wife") in Utah. Id. 
During Husband's service in the military, the Marine Corps has deployed him to 
serve at duty stations throughout the world such as Russia, Germany, Slovenia, Japan, 
Thailand, the Philippines, and California. (R:294). Despite these numerous transfers, 
Husband has always held himself out as a resident of Utah by, among other things, paying 
Utah taxes on his military pay (R: 153-156; 159-160), maintaining his Utah drivers license 
(R:136), the right to vote in Utah elections (R:127), listing his home as Kearns, Utah on 
military records (R:141), and declaring his intent to return to live in Utah once released 
from active-duty military service. (R: 126-127, 468). It is impossible for Husband to serve 
within Utah because the Marine Corps does not have a base in Utah. (R:467-468). 
Although Husband is, for the time being at least, stationed in California, it is a 
judicially noticeable fact that he is subject to the orders of his superior officers and can be 
transferred at any time at their whim. See Teague v. Third District Court, 289 P.2d 331, 
333 (Utah 1955). Therefore, Husband's presence in California is presumptively temporary 
because of his active-duty status. 
While Husband was deployed to California under military orders, Wife tried to file 
for a divorce against him in Utah. (R:487). Wife claims she could not because she was not 
-9-
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living in Utah at the time. Id. Undaunted, in April of 2005, Wife filed for a divorce in 
California instead. Id. Although Husband was still a resident of Utah and only in 
California because of military orders, he did not oppose Wife's divorce suit going 
forward in California. (R:468). The parties' California Decree of Divorce contains no 
finding that Husband ever established a domicile in California during the course of his 
deployment there. (R:4-50). Rather, the decree simply notes Husband had a "place of 
residence" to exercise parent-time in both San Diego and in Salt Lake City. (R:8). 
On June 12, 2005, Wife returned to live in Utah along with the parties' minor 
child. (R:179, 468). Wife and the parties' minor child have legally and physically resided 
in Utah ever since. Id. 
The parties eventually reached a settlement in Wife's California divorce 
proceeding and the court issued a Decree of Dissolution of Marriage on December 6, 
2006. (R:4-50). This Decree provided, among other things, that Husband would pay Wife 
$1,000 per month in child support based on her earning no monthly income at the time. 
(R-.12-13). 
Following the divorce, Wife obtained gainful employment in Utah. (R: 100-101, 
258). Accordingly, Husband desired to modify child support to take into account Wife's 
higher income. (R:53-54). Husband also desired to transfer and modify the parties' child 
support order in Utah given the fact he still legally resided in Utah and Wife had re-
established her residence in Utah. Id. 
-10-
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The Utah Proceeding 
On November 13, 2007, Husband, acting pro se, registered the parties' California 
Divorce Decree in the Third District Court for Salt Lake County, Utah, to begin the 
process of modifying that order in Utah. (R:l-3). Pursuant to the Uniform Interstate 
Family Support Act and Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, 
Husband gave Wife twenty (20) days to oppose registration of their California Divorce 
Decree in Utah. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-14-606. Wife never contested registration and 
the California Decree was subsequently registered as a Utah court order. (R:163). 
On November 27, 2007, Husband, still acting pro se, filed a "Petition to Modify 
Custody Order" asking the Utah court to modify child support, albeit with an 
unconventional caption. (R:53-54). Husband then filed an amended "Parentage Petition" 
on December 27, 2007 renewing his request to modify child support. (R:59-77). 
On December 3, 2007, the California court conducted a hearing on Wife's motion 
to increase Husband's child support obligation in California and denied her motion based 
on the fact Husband was moving the Utah court to modify child support. (R:105-106).The 
California court ruled that: 
"If Utah refuses to exert jurisdiction over the issue [of modifying child support 
then] either party may file their motion to be heard before this [California] court. 
If no motion has been brought in Utah for modification of child support, either party 
may file a motion requesting modification of child support to be heard before this 
court." (R:106)(emphasis added). 
Wife subsequently moved the Utah court to dismiss Husband's Parentage Petition. 
(R:86-88). At the hearing on Wife's motion on March 26, 2008, the Domestic Relations 
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Commissioner remarked that Utah might lack subject-matter jurisdiction to modify child 
support because of Husband's military deployment in California. (R:388, Hrg. Transcr. 
9:22-11:16 (March 10, 2008)). Nevertheless, the court declined to dismiss the Petition to 
modify child support. Id. Instead, the court held a Parentage Petition was an improper 
mechanism to modify child support. Id. at 11:14-12:1. Accor4ingly, the court granted 
Husband leave of court to submit an amended Petition to modify child support. Id. at 
12:4-11. 
Husband then retained counsel in Utah and, on June 25, 2008, filed an amended 
petition to modify child support in Utah asserting Utah had subject-matter jurisdiction 
under Utah Code Ann. §§ 7B-14-205 and 613 because both parents and their child legally 
resided in Utah and neither party had a California residence. (R: 126-134). Husband 
explained that his physical presence in California was merely temporary on account of his 
military deployment, that he had maintained his legal residenpe in Utah, and that he 
intended to return to Utah following his release from military service. (R: 126-127). 
Rather than waiting for Utah to decide whether it would assert jurisdiction, Wife 
ignored the California court's order deferring the question of jurisdiction to Utah and, on 
or about July 29, 2008, renewed her motion for California to increase Husband's child 
support obligation. 
On August 18, 2008, Husband filed a motion asking tjie Utah court, among other 
things, to decide whether it would assert subject-matter jurisdiction. (R: 168-174). At the 
September 17, 2008, hearing on Husband's motion, the Utah Commissioner denied 
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Husband's motion and held the UIFSA looks only at where a military service-member 
parent is physically stationed regardless of where his legal residence might be. (R:386, 
Hrg. Transcr. 24:9-27:5, 28:1-30:4 (September 26, 2008). Accordingly, the Commissioner 
concluded Utah lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to modify child support as long as 
Husband remained stationed in California even though his Wife and daughter resided in 
Utah. Id. Husband filed a timely objection to the Commissioner's recommendation on 
September 26, 2008 and requested a hearing before the District Court Judge. (R: 199-214). 
On or about September 27, 2008, Wife moved the Utah court to compel Husband 
to pay all her attorney's fees and costs because she prevailed on the question of whether 
Utah should have accepted jurisdiction or not. (R:216-217). Husband opposed the motion. 
(R:262-266, 319-322). 
On September 30, 2008, after Wife informed the California court that Utah had 
declined jurisdiction, California granted Wife's motion to increase Husband's child 
support and issued a modified support order. (R:484-500). The California court's stated 
basis for retaining jurisdiction was (1) because Husband made a "general appearance" 
litigating jurisdiction in California, (2) because Husband did not object to Wife 
registering the Utah child support order in California, and (3) because Husband was 
physically stationed in California. (R:485-488). However, the California court made no 
finding that Husband was ever domiciled in California. (R:484-499). 
On October 22, 2008, the Utah Commissioner ordered Husband to pay all of Wife 
attorney's fees and costs because she prevailed on the jurisdictional dispute. (R:323-325). 
-13-
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Although the court found her fees were reasonable and Husband had the ability to pay, 
the court made no finding that Wife needed help paying her l^gal expenses. Id. 
On October 28, 2008, the Utah District Court denied Husband's objection to the 
Commissioner's recommendation on the issue of jurisdiction, (R:315-316), and later 
denied his objection to the award of attorney's fees and costs. (R:360-361). 
Following the resolution of several post-judgment matters and entry of a final 
appealable judgment, Husband timely appealed the Utah trial court's decision (1) that the 
residence of a Utah military-service member under the UIFSA is where the military 
stations that soldier, (2) that the UIFSA looks only to the physical and not legal residence 
of Utah service-members, (3) that Utah lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over this matter, 
and (4) ordering Husband to pay Wife's attorney's fees and costs. (R:559-584). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (the "UIFSA") is a uniform act 
adopted by all fifty states for the purpose of ensuring interstate child support modification 
and enforcement laws are uniform across the country. The UIFSA is premised on the idea 
that only one state can have subject-matter jurisdiction to modify a child support order at 
any given time based on the "residence" of each parent. Because the purpose of the 
UIFSA is to narrowly restrict jurisdiction to a single state, the term "residence" must 
mean legal residence (of which there can only be one) as opposed to physical residence 
(of which there can be many). Construing "residence" as legal residence in the context of 
-14-
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the UIFSA is an acceptable plain-meaning interpretation because the UIFSA is a national 
law, and nationally "residence" in domestic relations statutes is construed as legal 
residence. Tellingly, every appellate court to consider what "residence" in the UIFSA 
means has uniformly treated it as legal residence. To disregard the compelling need to 
interpret the UIFSA in a consistent manner across state lines would promulgate further 
interstate jurisdictional conflicts and would promulgate absurd results by forcing courts to 
disregard common sense and consider military service-members deployed to, for 
example, Iraq as having an Iraqi residence under the UIFSA. 
Second, it is undisputed that Husband was a bona-fide and actual resident of Utah 
at the time he enlisted in the Marine Corps in Utah. Because Husband has maintained his 
ties to Utah throughout his military service by, among other things, paying Utah taxes on 
his military pay, the right to vote in Utah elections, maintaining his Utah drivers license, 
and because he plans to return to Utah once released from military service, Husband's 
legal residence presumptively remains in Utah. 
Therefore, because Husband legally resides in Utah and because Wife and the 
parties' child reside in Utah, Utah has subject-matter jurisdiction to modify the parties' 
child support order under Section 613 of the UIFSA. Because the court below held 
otherwise based on Husband's military deployment in California, its judgment must be 
reversed. Likewise, the trial court's order commanding Husband to pay attorney's fees 
and costs must also be reversed because it is premised on a flawed legal conclusion. 
Wife cannot use claim preclusion to sustain the otherwise erroneous judgment of 
-15-
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the court below based on California's issuance of modified child support order after the 
court below mistakenly declined jurisdiction. California deferred the question of which 
state should exercise jurisdiction to this state in its initial ruling. Therefore, this court 
retains authority to judicially review whether it was error for the court below to decline 
jurisdiction and, finding such error, to reverse that decision w^hile giving full faith and 
credit to California's judgment delegating the question of jurisdiction to Utah. The 
Restatement (Second) of Judgments authorizes this court to d^ny preclusive effect to a 
subsequent judgment made in reliance on an erroneous decision by the court below that 
would substantially infringe on the appellate authority of this tribunal and its power to 
ensure lower courts are correctly following the law. 
For these reasons, the judgment of the court below miist be reversed. 
ARGUMENT 
"From the Halls of Montezuma to the shores of Tripoli," military service-members 
are regularly moved across the globe as they fight to keep out nation safe from harm. As a 
result, Utah service-members and their families are often faced with great uncertainty 
when asked where their "residence" is. 
The question posed by this appeal is whether, under tlie Uniform Interstate Family 
Support Act (the "UIFSA"), a Utah military service-member retains his residence in Utah 
even though the military orders him to serve outside Utah's borders for years at a time. 
For the reasons discussed in this brief, the answer is that a Uf;ah service-member retains 
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his residence in Utah throughout the duration of his military service absent clear and 
convincing proof the service-member intends to abandon his Utah residence and 
permanently live elsewhere. Inasmuch as the court below held otherwise and mistakenly 
concluded it lacked jurisdiction because of Husband's military deployment to California, 
its judgment must be reversed. 
This brief is divided into five parts. Because subject-matter jurisdiction is always a 
threshold issue, Case v. Case, 2004 UT App 423, ^  6, 103 P.3d 171, Husband will first 
discuss (1) why the term "residence" and its variations in the UIFSA means legal 
residence, (2) that he still legally resides in Utah, and therefore (3) Utah has subject-
matter jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78B-14-613. Next, Husband will show (4) the 
court below exceeded its discretion by ordering Husband to pay Wife's attorney's fees 
and costs, and (5) California's subsequent reliance on the erroneous judgment of the court 
below carries no preclusive effect. Based on these points and the authorities discussed 
herein, the judgment of the court below must be reversed. 
I. "RESIDENCE" IN THE UNIFORM INTERSTATE FAMILY 
SUPPORT ACT MEANS LEGAL RESIDENCE. 
The question of whether the court below erroneously declined subject-matter 
jurisdiction to modify Husband's child support order is governed by the Uniform 
Interstate Family Support Act (the "UIFSA"). Case, 2004 UT App 423 at If 7. The UIFSA 
is a uniform law Congress compelled all fifty states to adopt in order to ensure child 
support modification and enforcement laws are uniform across state lines. Id. at fflf 7-8. 
This appeal presents a question of first impression: does the term "residence" in the 
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context of the UIFSA mean where a military-service member parent physically or legally 
resides? 
The Utah Supreme Court explained that to resolve questions of statutory 
interpretation: 
"[w]e look first to the plain language of the statutes to| determine their meaning 
and to discern the intent of the legislature. We also examine the purpose of the 
statute and its relation to other statutes. Provisions within a statute are interpreted 
in harmony with other provisions in the same statute and with other statutes under 
the same and related chapters. We do so because a statute is passed as a whole and 
not in parts or sections and is animated by one general purpose and intent. 
Consequently, each party or section should be construed in connection with every 
other part or section so as to produce a harmonious whole. Moreover, we avoid an 
interpretation that would embrace a result so absurd tfyat it could not have been 
intended by the legislature." Berneau v. Martino, 20($ UT 87,1j 12, 646 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 30 (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
When determining whether a statutory term or phrase is ambiguous, a court must 
not read those words in isolation from the rest of the statute. tDA v. Brown & 
Williamson, 529 U.S. 120, 132, 120 S.Ct. 1291, 146 L.Ed.24 121 (2000). The plain 
meaning - or ambiguity - of certain words or phrases may orily become apparent when 
read in context with the rest of the statute. Id. {citing Brown V. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 
118, 115 S.Ct. 552 (1994)("Ambiguity is a creature not of definitional possibilities but of 
statutory cortex/. ")(emphasis added). 
Finally, this court must remain mindful that the UIFSA is no ordinary Utah law. 
Because the purpose of the UIFSA is to make interstate child support enforcement and 
modifications laws uniform across the country, Case, 2004 UT App 423 at fflf 7-8, the 
Utah Legislature has instructed Utah courts that "[i]n applyijig and construing it 
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consideration must be given to the need to promote uniformity of the law with respect to 
its subject matter among states that enact it." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-14-901 (emphasis 
added). Accordingly, this court always looks at how its sister-states have construed the 
UIFSA to ensure Utah's UIFSA remains consistent with its sister-states. Case, 2004 UT 
App423 at Tflj 16-17. 
With these rules in mind, we turn to the main statutes at issue. Section 205 of the 
UIFSA provides that the state which issued an original child support order (in this case, 
California) retains "exclusive, continuing jurisdiction" to modify its order so long as it 
remains the "residence" of either parent or their child. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-14-
205(1 )(a). Section 613 of the UIFSA in turn provides that if all of the parties "reside" in 
this state and the child does not reside in the issuing state (California), Utah acquires 
subject-matter jurisdiction to modify that support order. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-14-
613(1). The difficulty in harmonizing these statutes is the UIFSA does not define whether 
the word "residence" and its variations in Sections 205 and 613 means where a military 
service-member parent legally or physically resides. 
A. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN LEGAL AND PHYSICAL RESIDENCE, 
Before beginning a discussion of why legal residence is the most sensible 
interpretation of this term, it is imperative to discuss the difference between one's 
physical residence and legal residence (also known as domicile). Physical residence just 
means bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place regardless of whether that stay is 
temporary or indefinite. Keene v. Bosner, 2005 UT App 37, If 11, 107 P.3d 693. On the 
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other hand, legal residence requires both bodily presence in a given place coupled with 
the intention to make that place one's home. Id. Under these definitions, a person can 
have multiple physical residences but never more than a singly legal residence at any 
given time. Id. 
B. THE MEANING OF "RESIDENCE" DEPENDS ON THE CONTEXT IN 
WHICH IT IS USED, 
Courts and legal scholars have long referred to "residence" as a slippery eel whose 
proper meaning ultimately depends on the context in which it is used. See In re Morelli, 
91 Cal.Rptr. 72, 78-9 (Cal.App.2.Dist. 1970); Willis L.M. Re^se & Robert S. Green, That 
Elusive Wordy "Residence, " 6 Vand. L.Rev. 561 (1953). Utah's legislature and courts 
have interpreted "residence" and "resides" differently depending on the context the terms 
are used in. Keene v. Bosner, 2005 UT App 37 at |^ 11; Framq v. Residency Appeals 
Committee of Utah State Univ., 675 P.2d 1157, 1159 fn. 1 (Utah 1983)("In some contexts 
the terms residence and domicile have different meanings, bu^ : for the purpose of this 
opinion we will treat them synonymously"); Government Emft. Ins. Co. v. Dennis, 645 
P.2d 672, 674 (Utah 1982)(While domicile is the most steadfast of words, residence, on 
the other hand, has about as many colors as Joseph's cloak and no precise, technical, and 
fixed definition applicable to all cases). For example, in the context of Utah's Cohabitant 
Abuse Act, this court construed "residence" anew as physical presence to ensure victims 
of domestic violence could seek protective orders against their attackers wherever they 
might be found even if that was not their attacker's legal domicile. Keene, 2005 UT App 
37 at Iff 11, 15. Conversely, in suits over voter registration statutes the Utah Supreme 
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Court interpreted "resides" and "residence" narrowly as legal residence to ensure a person 
could not vote in more than a single locale at a time. Dodge v. Evans, 716 P.2d 270, 275 
(Utah 1985). The Utah Supreme Court has also interpreted "residence" as synonymous 
with domicile in divorce jurisdictional statutes unless the statute expressly requires actual 
physical residence. See Munsee v. Munsee, 363 P.2d 71, 72 (Utah 1961)(We consider the 
phrase bona fide residence to be synonymous with domicile]. But 'actual residence' 
requires something more). 
In an effort to cage this slippery eel, this court has sometimes turned to the 
dictionary to determine how to interpret "residence." Keene, 2005 UT App 37 at [^ 11. 
When called upon to interpret this term anew in the context of Utah's domestic violence 
laws, this court relied on Webster's Dictionary which defines "residence" as "a temporary 
or permanent dwelling place, abode, or habitation to which one intends to return as 
distinguished from a place of temporary sojourn or transient visit." Id. {citing Webster's 
Third New International Dictionary 1931 (1993)). On the other hand, the Merriam-
Webster Dictionary (which proclaims itself as being America's "best-selling Dictionary") 
defines "residence" as either "the place where one actually lives as distinguished from 
one's domicile or a place of temporary sojourn" or "the status of a legal resident." 
Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 1060 (11th Ed.)(emphasis added). The 
Merriam-Webster Dictionary also defines "reside" as either "to dwell permanently or 
continuously" or "to occupy a place as one's legal domicile." Id- (emphasis added). 
Consequently, an appeal to dictionaries used by laymen fails to authoritatively establish a 
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single "plain meaning" definition of the words "residence" and "resides," but rather 
recognizes these words are open to more than one reasonable interpretation.1 
Given this inherent ambiguity, this court must analyze the UIFSA's provisions in 
context to determine which interpretation of "residence" would (1) best fulfill the 
fundamental purposes of the UIFSA, (2) ensure child support modification laws remain 
uniform between the states, and (3) avoid absurd consequences not intended by the 
Legislature. 
C. READ IN CONTEXT, "RESIDENCE" MEANS LEGAL RESIDENCE 
Construing "residence" as legal residence is supported by the plain language and 
official comments of the UIFSA. In the words of the drafters, the purpose of Section 205 
in the UIFSA is to ensure "only one valid support order may be effective at any one time" 
even though the parties and their children may move from state to state. In re Marriage of 
Amezquita, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 887, 889-90 (Cal.App. 3 Dist. 2002). Under this section, 
California retains "continuing, exclusive jurisdiction" only if it is Husband's "residence." 
If California's jurisdiction is exclusive then, by definition, neither Utah nor any other 
state could have jurisdiction. Therefore, the language of the UIFSA assumes a person 
l The purpose of Utah's domestic violence statutes are to enlarge - not restrict -
which courts can have jurisdiction to give relief to domestic violence victims. Public 
policy is well-served by construing "residence" as broadly as possible to ensure 
perpetrators of domestic violence are held accountable for their wrongs. Conversely, the 
purpose of the UIFSA is to restrict - not enlarge - the number of states having 
jurisdiction to modify a child support order at any given timq. 
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cannot have more than one "residence."2 Id. at 890. However, this does not support 
interpreting the term as physical residence because a person can have multiple physical 
residences, but can never legally reside in more than one place at a time. Id. Therefore, 
"residence," viewed in context with the UIFSA as a whole, must mean legal residence of 
which there can only be one. 
Furthermore, courts generally construe "residence," whether used as a noun or a 
verb, as synonymous with legal residence in the context of statutes that prescribe 
residence as a qualification for the enjoyment of a privilege, the exercise of a franchise, or 
the venue for an action. Dodge, 716 P.2d at 275; In re Marriage of Basilehu 890 N.E.2d 
779, 787 (Ind.App.2008); See Utah Code Ann. § 20A-2-105; 12 A.L.R.2d 757 § 3 
(Majority rule is that residence in venue statutes, regardless of whether the term is used as 
a noun or a verb, is synonymous with domicile). Thus, under the UIFSA, if Husband's 
"residence" remains in Utah he will continue to enjoy access to Utah's courts for the 
purpose of modifying his existing child support order in addition to other rights and 
protections afforded to Utah residents. Basileh, 890 N.E.2d at 787. This constitutes the 
enjoyment of a privilege, the exercise of a franchise, and the setting of a proper venue for 
an action as envisioned by courts that have construed "residence," in both noun and verb 
form, as meaning legal residence. Id. In a similar vein, Wife will enjoy the benefit of only 
2 Compare with Utah Code Ann. § 78B-14-205(2)(a) which uses the term "state of 
residence" rather than "states of residence" or "a state of residence." Furthermore, 
Section 205(1 )(a) speaks in terms of "the residence" as opposed to "a residence" or 
"residences" further implying the drafter's assumption that each parent would only have a 
single "residence." 
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having to travel to a local Utah courthouse (rather than having to travel all the way out to 
California) if she ever wants to modify child support or bring an enforcement action 
against Husband. 
D. LEGAL RESIDENCE IS AN ACCEPTABLE PLAIN-MEANING 
CONSTRUCTION OF "RESIDENCE." 
Interpreting the terms "residence" and "resides" in the UIFSA as meaning "legal 
residence" and "legally resides" does not stretch these words beyond an acceptable, plain-
meaning limit. The commonly-used Merriam-Webster Dictionary expressly recognizes 
these words are often used as synonyms for domicile. See Merriam-Webster's Collegiate 
Dictionary 1060 (11 Ed.). Furthermore, it is well-documented both in Utah, Munsee, 363 
P.2d at 72, and on a national level, 27A C.J.S. Divorce § 154, that courts regularly 
construe "residence" and "resides" as legal residence in domestic relations statutes unless 
the statute explicitly requires actual residence. Because the UIFSA is a national law, the 
Utah Legislature was presumably aware of this and expected courts interpreting the 
UIFSA to look at how this term is defined on a national level in order to promote national 
uniformity of its jurisdictional provisions. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-14-901. 
E. INTERPRETING "RESIDENCE" AS LEGAL RESIDENCE IS ESSENTIAL 
TO PROMOTE NATIONAL UNIFORMITY, 
Interpreting "residence" as legal residence is the only interpretation that will avoid 
interstate jurisdictional conflicts. Although this is a case of first impression for Utah, this 
court is not writing on a clean slate. Several of Utah's sister-states have already analyzed 
what "residence" in the UIFSA means and they agree the term means legal residence. 
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Under Utah Code Ann. § 78B-14-901, courts construing the UIFSA must give 
consideration to the need to promote uniform interpretations of the UIFSA because 
conflicting interpretations will lead to jurisdictional uncertainty, encourage forum 
shopping, and will condemn more military families to costly, protracted litigation like this 
as they try to reconcile different versions of what was supposed to be a national, uniform 
law designed to prevent such conflicts. 
California 
Under facts similar to the instant case, the California Court of Appeal held the 
term "residence" in the UIFSA meant domicile. Amezquita, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 887. After 
thoroughly examining the UIFSA's official comments and statutory context, the court 
reasoned that because the UIFSA is designed to narrowly restrict jurisdiction to a single 
state and the UIFSA assumes each parent only has one "residence," the term must mean 
domicile - of which there can only be one - rather than mere physical presence. Id. at 
888-91. Because the father was only in California because of a military assignment and 
showed no intention to permanently live in California after retirement, he did not have a 
California residence under the UIFSA. Id. at 890-91. 
Minnesota 
Three years later, the Minnesota Court of Appeals held that because the UIFSA 
narrowly permits only one state to exercise continuing, exclusive jurisdiction and assumes 
each parent only has one "residence," the term must mean domicile. Block v. Block, 2005 
WL 89472 fn. 1 (Minn.App. Jan 18, 2005) (Unpublished). 
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Georgia 
Following Amezquita and Block, the Georgia Court of Appeals concurred in its 
sister-state's reasoning that "residence" in the UIFSA means legal residence, and a 
military service-member father stationed in Georgia under military orders remained a 
legal resident of the state he joined the army in. Kean v. Marshall 669 S.E.2d 463, 464-
66 (Ga.App. 2008). 
Alabama 
In Lattimore v. Lattimore, the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals construed the term 
"residence" in the UIFSA as legal residence. 991 So.2d 239, 243-44 (Ala.Civ.App. 2008). 
However, because the appeal arose in the context of a motion to dismiss the court was 
required to accept as true the mother's claim that her service-member husband acquired a 
legal residence in Alabama. Id. Accordingly, the court remanded the case for further fact 
finding. Id. However, the court reaffirmed the longstanding presumption that "a person 
who is inducted into military service retains residence in the state from which he is 
inducted until a new residence is established or the initial residence is abandoned." Id. 
Missouri 
In State ex. rel. Havlin, the Missouri Court of Appeals held a father who left 
Tennessee because of a temporary overseas work assignment remained a resident of 
Tennessee under the UIFSA because he still paid taxes in his home state, maintained his 
voter registration, vehicle registration, and intended to return home after his overseas 
assignment was complete. 971 S.W.2d 938 (Mo.App. 1998). In doing so, the court 
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engaged in a domicile analysis and implicitly construed "residence" as meaning legal 
residence. Id. 
Texas 
The Court of Appeals of Texas held it lost exclusive, continuing jurisdiction under 
the UIFSA to modify a child support previously issued by a Texas court even though the 
father was physically living in Texas because he only was back in Texas because he was 
incarcerated in a Texas prison. Grimes v. McFarland, 2003 WL 21787030 (Tex.App,-
Houston (14 Dist.)(Unpublished). The court held the father did not "reside" in Texas 
under the UIFSA because he was only in Texas under compulsion, and analogized his 
situation that of a military service-member stationed in Texas who likewise would not be 
considered a Texas resident. Cf. Id. (citing Randle v. Randle, 178 S.W.2d 570, 572 
(Tex.Civ.App.-Galveston 1944)(Soldier stationed in Texas did not 'reside' in Texas). 
Indiana 
Construing the UIFSA's federal counterpart, the Full Faith and Credit for Child 
Support Orders Act (the "FFCCSOA"), the Court of Appeals of Indiana held the term 
"residence" meant domicile. Basileh, 890 N.E.2d at 787. The court reasoned that courts 
treat "residence" and "domicile" as synonyms when construing a statute that prescribes 
residence as a qualification for the enjoyment of a privilege or exercise of a franchise, and 
the father would enjoy continued access to Indiana court's if he remained a legal resident 
of Indiana. Id. Following further judicial review, the Supreme Court of Indiana summarily 
affirmed the Court of Appeals' interpretation of "residence" and held it applied with 
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equal force to the UIFSA itself. In re the Marriage of Basileh^ 912 N.E.2d 814, 817 fn. 1 
(Ind. 2009). 
Given the fact every state to consider what "residence" means in the context of the 
UIFSA has construed it as legal residence, this state cannot adopt a contrary interpretation 
without inviting jurisdictional conflicts. Military service-members from Utah would be 
thrust into perpetual confusion with no way of knowing, short, of costly protracted 
litigation like this, where their "residence" is under the UIFSA was if this court said it 
was where they were physically stationed, but the state where they were stationed in (e.g. 
California, Texas, Minnesota, Georgia, Alabama, Indiana, or Missouri) said it was their 
legal residence. 
F. INTERPRETING "RESIDENCE" AS PHYSICAL RESIDENCE WOULD 
LEAD TO ABSURD RESULTS AND JURISDICTIONAL CONFLICTS, 
Finally, this court must reject any interpretation that could lead to absurd results. 
State ex. rel. Z.C., 2007 UT 54, If 11,165 P.3d 1206. The "absurd results" canon of 
statutory interpretation is an equally well-settled caveat to the "plain meaning" doctrine 
and states a court should not follow the literal language of a statute if doing so would lead 
to absurd results not intended by the Legislature. Id. Although the "plain meaning" canon 
enjoys a robust presumption in its favor, it is also true that a legislative body cannot, in 
every instance, be counted on to have said what it meant or to have meant what it said. Id. 
Because service-members are subject to the orders of their superior officers, they 
have no choice where they want to live. Teague, 289 P.2d at 333. Consequently, to hold 
that Utah military service-members acquire a "residence" whenever the military 
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fortuitously happens to station them leads to patently absurd results. For example, it 
would defy common sense to say a service-member deployed to Iraq as part of our 
country's war on terror resides in Iraq or has an Iraqi residence. Rather, common sense 
tells us the soldier is probably there on a temporary assignment and will return home at 
the end of the war or his release from military service. Nevertheless, if the UIFSA is 
construed as looking at physical presence regardless of whether that presence is 
compulsory then, under the broad definition of this term espoused in Keene, this Utah 
soldier resides in Iraq and has forfeit any claim to having a Utah residence because he 
decided to serve his country. This is a patent example of an absurd result. 
Adding to this absurdity, if the service-member's spouse then left Utah (assuming 
Utah issued their original support order), Utah would lose exclusive, continuing 
jurisdiction over child support order because of the soldier's deployment. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-14-205 (Issuing state loses exclusive jurisdiction when both parents and their 
child no longer have a "residence" in this state). As a result, Utah service-members would 
lose the stability associated with keeping their child support cases in Utah and would live 
in fear of having their support orders modified every time they got moved. 
Likewise, service-members from Utah's sister-states temporarily stationed at Hill 
Air Force Base or Camp Williams thinking they still legally resided in their respective 
home-states would be surprised to discover they now had a Utah residence under the 
UIFSA and were subject to having their child support cases modified here. Under these 
absurd circumstances, it would be possible for two states (Utah and the soldier's home-
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state) to have jurisdiction to modify a support order at the same time. 
Because there is no way the Utah Legislature could have intended such absurd 
consequences, it is imperative Utah join with its sister-states who have uniformly agreed 
"residence" in the UIFSA means legal residence. 
II. BECAUSE HUSBAND JOINED THE MILITARY IN UTAH, HE 
PRESUMPTIVELY CONTINUES TO LEGALLY RESIDE IN UTAH. 
Having shown that "residence" in the UIFSA means legal residence, the next issue 
for this court to resolve is where Husband's legal residence is. Because the court below 
did not make any findings of fact on this issue, (R: 556), the proper inquiry on appeal is 
whether Husband has made a prima-facie case that he has retained his Utah residency 
since joining the Marine Corps in Utah back in 1994. To resolve this question, it is 
necessary to first review the law of domicile. 
In several different contexts, the Utah Legislature has defined legal residence (or 
domicile) as the place where (1) an individual has a fixed permanent home and principal 
establishment, (2) to which the individual if absent intends to return, and (3) in which the 
individual and his family voluntarily reside, not for a special br temporary purpose, but 
with the intention of making a permanent home. See Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-
202(a)(emphasis added); Cf Utah Code Ann. § 20A-2-105. A legal residence, once 
established, cannot be lost until another legal residence is acquired. See Utah Code Ann. § 
20A-2-105(4)(j)(iii); Utah Code Ann. §§ 20A-2-105(4)(c)(i); 31A-29-103; 25 Am. Jur. 2d 
Domicil § 28. While domicile presumptively follows physical residence, Allen v. 
Greyhound Lines, Inc., 583 P.2d 613, 615 (Utah 1978), this presumption does not apply 
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to military service-members. See Utah Code Ann. § 20A-2-105(4)(c)(i); Dodge, 716 P.2d 
at 274 (Acquisition of a domicile requires some free exercise of the will on the part of the 
person involved. An act done by him under physical compulsion will be legally 
ineffective for this purpose). Rather, the law presumes military service-members continue 
to legally reside in the state they joined the military absent proof they have abandoned 
their initial domicile and established a new one. See Teague, 289 P.2d at 333 ("This court 
might take judicial notice to the fact that a soldier is subject to transfer at any time and 
that his presence in any one place will probably be temporary."); 21 A.L.R.2d 1163 
(Practically all authorities agree that military personnel retain a domicile in the state from 
which they entered military service); 28 C.J.S. Domicile § 35 (Because a person in 
military service is subject to the orders of his superior officers, he retains a domicile or 
residence in the state from which he entered the service). This rebuttable presumption of 
continued residency can only be overcome by clearing and convincing proof that the 
service-member intends to make his duty station his new permanent home. 25 Am. Jur. 2d 
Domicil § 28. Simply put, a soldier's mere physical presence in a place under military 
orders is insufficient to prove a change in domicile. 
The pivotal case illustrating these principles involved a Navy sailor who, after 
spending 11 years away from his home-state of Maryland in military service, sued for a 
divorce in Maryland. Wamslev v. Wamsley, 635 A.2d 1322, 1322-23 (Md. 1994). 
Maryland's highest court unanimously held that notwithstanding the sailor's many years 
of absence while in military service, he still resided in Maryland because he joined the 
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Navy in Maryland, held Maryland out as his home on military records, maintained his 
driver's license and voter registration in Maryland, and paid Maryland income taxes. Id. 
at 1325-1326. This holding is in accord with how the majority of states have resolved 
similar issues. Id. at 1325 fn. 1. 
Similarly, the California Court of Appeal held the fact a father was stationed in 
California under military orders was insufficient to give him a California domicile. 
Amezquita, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 887. The court explained that: 
"[although Husband has lived in California for several years on military 
assignment, the record is uncontradicted that he does not intend to remain here 
after retirement and, instead, intends to return to New Mexico. He retains his New 
Mexico driver's license, and he votes and pays taxes there." Id. 
In re the Marriage of Thornton, the California Court of Appeal held that even 
acquisition of a house in California by a military service-meniber was insufficient to 
prove a soldier intended to make California his new domicile if contradicted by other 
evidence. 185 Cal.Rptr. 388, 393-94 (Cal.App 5 Dist. 1982). The Wamslev court 
explained: 
"[t]he fact that members of the military are frequently tnoved about under military 
orders will more than explain why an individual occupies a place of abode beyond 
the state's borders. In the case of members of the military, as in other cases, the 
rules for determining domicile may be applied differently in a particular case, but 
the basic thrust thereof is to get the best indication of intent." 
634 A.2d at 1325. (internal citations omitted). 
Here, there is no dispute whatsoever that Husband was born, raised, and graduated 
high school in Utah. Therefore, Husband was a bona-fide and actual resident of Utah 
under every conceivable definition of the term when he enlistpd in the Marine Corps in 
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1994. The record clearly shows that throughout his deployments in Russia, Germany, 
Slovenia, Japan, Thailand, the Philippines, and California, Husband has always paid Utah 
income taxes on his military pay, remained registered to vote in Utah elections, 
maintained his Utah driver's license, held Utah out as his home on military records, and 
has submitted sworn testimony declaring his intention to return to live in Utah once 
released from military service. Under these facts, Husband has sufficiently proved that his 
domicile remains in Utah and he has never established a residence elsewhere. 
Because the law presumes that Husband already is, and remains, a Utah resident, 
the burden of proof must necessarily shift to Wife to rebut this presumption by proving, if 
she can, that Husband abandoned his Utah residence and established a new domicile in 
California. However, the fact Wife sued Husband for a divorce in California while he was 
stationed there is insufficient to prove Husband ever formed the requisite intent to 
abandon his Utah residence and permanently remain behind in California. Rather, both 
California and Utah law allow divorce proceedings to go forward even if only one spouse 
is a domiciliary of that state. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-1(2) and California Family Code 
§ 2320. California Family Code § 2322 even recognizes that it is possible for a husband 
and wife to each have a "separate domicile and residence for the purpose of a divorce 
proceeding depending upon proof of the fact and not upon legal presumptions." 
(emphasis added). 
Because Wife voluntarily chose California as the forum for their divorce - not 
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Husband - she presumptively claimed a California residence in the process.3 The record 
is devoid of any proof that Husband ever intended to remain in California following their 
divorce for any reason other than his military deployment. Under similar facts, the 
California Court of Appeal held that a military service-member stationed in California 
who was sued for divorce by his wife in California and consented to entry of child 
custody, support, and property division orders did not establish a California residence. In 
re the Marriage of Tucker, 277 Cal.Rptr. 403 (Cal.App. 1 Dist. 1994). Because the 
husband still paid Florida income taxes, voted in Florida elections, and listed Florida as 
his home on military records, his wife could not carry her burden of proving he ever 
formed the requisite intent to permanently reside in California after the divorce so as to 
make him a California domiciliary. Id. at 408-409. 
In light of Husband's undisputed continuing connections to Utah (paying taxes, 
voter registration, drivers license, holding himself out as a Ut^h resident on military 
records, and subjective intent to return), the presumption Husband continues to legally 
reside in Utah remains un-rebutted. Therefore, the court below committed prejudicial 
error by dismissing Husband's Petition to modify without considering this presumption. 
3 The Commissioner expressed his bewilderment at how this was possible given that 
Wife was only in California because she accompanied her military service-member 
husband there and presumably would have remained a Utah resident along with him. 
R:386, Hrg. Transcr. 9:21-10:18 (September 17, 2008). While Husband agrees the 
Commissioner's suspicions about Wife's claim to California residency are well taken, the 
time to litigate whether Wife ever had the requisite intent to become a California 
domiciliary has long passed, and the parties are presumably estopped to deny the validity 
of their original Divorce Decree. 
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Consequently, its judgment must be reversed and remanded for further proceedings. 
III. BECAUSE BOTH PARTIES AND THEIR CHILD LEGALLY 
RESIDE IN UTAH, THIS STATE HAS SUBJECT-MATTER 
JURISDICTION UNDER SECTION 613 OF THE UIFSA. 
Because Husband joined the Marine Corps in Utah and has maintained extensive 
ties to Utah for all the reasons discussed supra, Husband continues to legally reside in 
Utah. The court below made no findings sufficient to rebut this presumption. Therefore, 
under Section 205 of the UIFSA, Utah Code Ann. § 78B-14-205(1), California lost 
exclusive, continuing jurisdiction to modify the parties' child support order once Wife 
returned to Utah because she no longer had a California residence {assuming she had one 
to begin with) and Husband never acquired a California residence. Utah acquired 
jurisdiction to modify the parties' California support order under Section 613 of the 
UIFSA, Utah Code Ann, § 78B-14-613(1), once Wife returned to Utah because now both 
parents and their child legally reside in Utah. Consequently, it was error for the court 
below to dismiss Husband's Petition to modify, and its decision must be reversed. 
IV. THE LOWER COURT EXCEEDED ITS DISCRETION BY 
ORDERING HUSBAND TO PAY WIFE'S ATTORNEY'S FEES 
BASED ON A FLAWED LEGAL CONCLUSION AND WITHOUT 
MAKING SUFFICIENT FINDINGS OF FACT. 
Although courts have discretion to award attorney's fees in divorce cases, Bolliger 
v. Bolliger, 2000 UT App 47, U 26, 997 P.3d 903, that discretion is not unlimited. See 
Lund v. Brown, 2000 UT 75, If 9, 11 P.3d 277. For instance, a decision premised on 
flawed legal conclusions constitutes a per se abuse of discretion. Id. Courts have no 
discretion to act contrary to Utah law, and this court is the arbiter of what Utah law is. 
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The lower court's stated reason for ordering Husband to pay Wife's attorney's fees 
and costs was that Wife prevailed on the issue of whether Utah should have declined 
jurisdiction in the first place. R:387, Hrg. Transc. 10:6-11:22 (October 22, 2008, 
Hearing). The court below did not offer any alternative rationale besides this faulty legal 
conclusion to justify its decision to award fees and costs to Wife. Therefore, because the 
decision to decline jurisdiction was premised on an erroneous interpretation of the 
UIFSA, the court committed a per se abuse of discretion by forcing Husband to pay 
Wife's costs and fees. 
In addition, this court has held time and time again that courts cannot award 
attorney's fees in divorce cases without making explicit findings of fact that (I) the 
receiving spouse is in financial need of attorney ysfeesf (2) the obligor spouse has the 
ability to pay, and (3) the fees and costs sought are reasonable. Jensen v. Jensen, 2009 UT 
App 1,118, 203 P.3d 1020 (emphasis added). Failure to explicitly make all these 
requisite findings likewise constitutes an abuse of discretion because omitting a requisite 
finding precludes effective appellate review. Id; Bakanowski v. Bakanowski, 2003 UT 
App 357,1| 10, 80 P.3d 153. 
Although the court below was mindful of this well-kno>vn test and made findings 
as to reasonableness and Husband's ability to pay, Wife did not present any evidence by 
way of affidavit, exhibit, or proffer that she needed help paying her own legal expenses. 
Accordingly, the court made no finding that she needed help paying her legal expenses 
(especially given the fact she is enjoying a Utah cost-of-living while receiving extra child 
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support payments based on a higher California cost-of-living). By failing to present any 
evidence of this essential element of her demand for attorney's fees coupled with the 
court's failure to make any finding she needed help, there was no legal basis to award 
attorney's fees to Wife. Accordingly, in addition to exceeding its discretion by awarding 
attorney's fees premised on a flawed legal conclusion, the court below also exceeded its 
discretion by awarding attorney's fees to Wife without finding she was in need of help 
paying her legal fees. 
For both these reasons, the lower court's decision to award Wife attorney's fees 
and costs must be vacated in its entirety. 
V. CLAIM PRECLUSION DOES NOT APPLY BECAUSE 
CALIFORNIA DELEGATED THE QUESTION OF JURISDICTION 
TO UTAH. 
California's subsequent September 30, 2008 ruling has no preclusive effect on this 
court's authority to correct the Utah District Court's erroneous decision declining 
jurisdiction in the first place because California's December 3, 2007 ruling delegated the 
authority to decide which state should exercise jurisdiction to Utah. California 
conditioned its retention of jurisdiction on Utah declining to observe jurisdiction over this 
case. Wife conceded this delegation before the court below and stated: 
"The [California] Court declines to make orders on the issue of modification of 
child support based on the knowledge there is a pending motion in Utah. If Utah 
refuses to observe jurisdiction over the issue, either party may file their motion to 
be heard before [the California] Court. So, the bottom line is basically the 
Court in California was just deferring to our Court to determine whether we 
were going to proceed, and then if this [Utah] Court did not proceed, find it 
has jurisdiction, then either party could proceed in California..." 
R: 388, Hrg. Transcr. 9:8-18 (March 10, 2008) (emphasis added). 
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It was not until after the Utah trial court erroneously declined jurisdiction over this 
matter that California modified its order. So, the question arisps whether a California trial 
court has the power to bar this court from ever judicially reviewing an inferior Utah 
court's judgment just by issuing a subsequent order premised on the erroneous Utah 
judgment in controversy? The answer is that a California trial court cannot substantially 
infringe on this court's appellate authority in such a manner, 4nd this court may refuse to 
grant preclusive effect to California's modification order consistent with the full faith and 
credit clause and California law. 
The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly endorsed the Restatement (Second) of 
Judgments as authority on under what circumstances a court niiay deny preclusive effect to 
a judgment issued by another court. See Salt Lake City v. Silver Fork Pipline Co., 913 
P.2d 731, 733(Utah 1996); Sandy City v. Salt Lake County, 8|7 P.2d 227, 230-31 (Utah 
1992). 
Section 28 of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments allows re-litigation of an 
issue in circumstances such as this where a party could not, as| a matter of law, have 
obtained judicial review of the judgment in the initial action, because California issued 
an order modifying support after the Utah trial court erroneously declined jurisdiction, 
there was nothing a California appellate court could do to rempdy this problem and force 
Utah to accept jurisdiction. Only a Utah appellate court had th£ power to correct a Utah 
court's erroneous decision declining jurisdiction. Thus, any appeal taken from the 
California trial court's decision would have been an exercise iji futility and barred by law 
-38-
Brief of the Appellant 
because California had no choice but to offer Wife a proverbial "port in a storm" until 
Utah's judgment declining jurisdiction was reversed. Under these special and unique 
circumstances, Section 28 of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments justifies denying 
any preclusive effect to California's modification order because to hold otherwise would 
place Husband in an impossible catch-22 where neither California nor Utah's appellate 
courts could judicially review this matter. This case simply does not present the kind of 
circumstances that the policies underlying preclusion were designed to guard against. 
For similar reasons, Section 12 of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments also 
supports denying preclusive effect to California's modification order. This section states: 
"[w]hen a court has rendered a judgment in a contested action, the judgment 
precludes the parties from litigating the question of the court's subject matter 
jurisdiction in subsequent litigation except if: 
(1) The subject matter of the action was so plainly beyond the court's jurisdiction 
that its entertaining the action was a manifest abuse of authority; or 
(2) Allowing the judgment to stand would substantially infringe on the 
authority of another tribunal or agency of government." 
Id. (emphasis added). 
Here, allowing California's reliance on the erroneous judgment of the court below 
to infringe on this tribunal's power to judicially review and correct the ruling of an 
inferior Utah court would substantially infringe on this court's authority and duty to 
ensure Utah courts are correctly following Utah law. Granting preclusion in cases like this 
would render the decisions of District Court Judges and even Commissioners immune 
from judicial review so long as the prevailing party was able to persuade a sister-state's 
court to rely on that judgment before the non-prevailing party could obtain judicial review 
before this court. This would prevent this court from ensuring Utah's interstate support 
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modification laws are in harmony with its sister-states until it was too late. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 78B-14-901. Such a holding is untenable and would p^ace Husband in an 
impossible catch-22. For these reasons, pursuant to Section l£ of the Restatement 
(Second) of Judgments, this court must not grant California's reliance on the erroneous 
decision of the court below any preclusive effect. 
Fortunately, judicial review and reversal of the Utah court's judgment will not 
present any full faith and credit issues because a judgment issued by a sister-state is 
entitled to no more preclusive effect than it would possess under the laws of the State in 
which the judgment was rendered. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738. Under California law, an order 
giving effect to a void judgment is void itself. Residents for Adequate Water v. Redwood 
Valley County Water Dist., 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 123, 125 (CaLApiU Dist 1995)(citing Ventura 
County v. Tillett 183 Cal.Rptr. 741 (Cal.App.2 Dist 1982)). Void judgments remain open 
to both direct and collateral attack even if the underlying judgment itself was not 
appealed. Id. It is well-settled law that void judgments have nb preclusive effect. Roy 
Shepherd Ins. v.Mayer, 883 P.2d 1358 (Utah 1994). 
Because California conditioned its retention of jurisdiction based on how Utah 
ruled, the validity of the California court's subsequent order i$ conditioned on the validity 
of the Utah court's judgment declining jurisdiction in the first place. As a general rule, the 
ruling of an appellate court is deemed to state the true nature Of the law retrospectively. 
Malan v.Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 676 (Utah 1984). Therefore, by holding that the court 
below misconstrued the UIFSA and erroneously declined jurisdiction in the first place, 
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this court will be retroactively vacating the very order California's assumption of 
jurisdiction is conditioned upon.4 Under California law, this will automatically render 
California's September 30, 2008, judgment void on its face because "an order giving 
effect to a void judgment is also void." In re Marriage of Brockman, 240 Cal.Rptr. 96, 97 
(Cal.App.2d Dist 1987). Inasmuch as void judgments carry no preclusive effect, Wife's 
claim preclusion and full faith and credit defenses become moot. Roy Shepherd, 883 P.3d 
at 1358 (Once an appellate court eliminates the basis for res judicata, the judgment 
appealed may be reversed). 
Reversing the judgment of the court below and thereby invalidating California's 
order made in reliance on that judgment will not infringe on California's authority nor 
deny its judgments full-faith and credit. Rather, this court will be giving full faith to 
California's December 3, 2007, decision conditioning its retention of jurisdiction based 
on how Utah ruled. If Utah asserted jurisdiction - California would not. Therefore, there 
is no full faith and credit issue by holding that Utah should have accepted subject-matter 
jurisdiction to begin with. 
A. ALTERNATIVELY, CALIFORNIA IS OBLIGED TO VACATE ITS 
ORDER ONCE THIS COURT REVERSES THE JUDGMENT OF THE 
COURT BELOW. 
Alternatively, if this court believes reversing the Utah court's decision declining 
4 This solution is distinguishable and does not conflict with this court's recent 
decision in Maero v. Topaz, 2009 UT App 300, 221 P.3d 860, because the bankruptcy 
court in Maero never conditioned its ruling on how the Utah court ruled. Conversely, here 
California delegated the authority to decide which court should exercise jurisdiction to 
this court and conditioned its exercise of jurisdiction upon this court's ruling. 
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jurisdiction would only render California's judgment voidable - as opposed to void- then 
comment c of Section 16 of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments provides a solution to 
reconcile these otherwise inconsistent judgments: 
"If, when the earlier judgment is set aside or reversed, the later judgment is still 
subject to a post-judgment motion for a new trial or the like ... a party may inform 
the trial or appellate court of the nullification of the earlier judgment and the 
consequent eliminating of the basis for the later judgment. The court should then 
normally set aside the later judgment." Sandy City v. Salt Lake County, 827 P.2d 
227, 230-31 (Utah I992)(citing Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 16, com. c). 
Under California law, a party may file a post-judgment motion to vacate a 
judgment giving effect to a void judgment at any time. California Code Civ. P. § 473(d); 
Cf. Utah R. of Civ. P. § 60(b)(5) (Courts may set aside a final order when the judgment it 
is based upon is later reversed or vacated). Upon being informed of this court's 
nullification of the Utah court's decision declining jurisdiction which formed the basis for 
its retention of jurisdiction, California would be obliged to s t^ aside its judgment thereby 
eliminating any preclusive effect its decision might otherwise carry. Accordingly, after 
reversing the Utah court's erroneous judgment declining jurisdiction in the first place, this 
court may reverse and remand this case back to the trial court with instructions to grant 
Husband sixty (60) days to petition California to vacate its September 30, 2008, judgment 
in light of this reversal. Assuming California complies with its own precedents and 
vacates its order giving effect to a voided judgment, Wife's [preclusion argument would 
still be rendered moot. 
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B. CALIFORNIA'S ORDER IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE FULL 
FAITH AND CREDIT FOR CHILD SUPPORT ORDERS ACT AND 
THEREFORE NOT ENTITLED TO PRECLUSIVE EFFECT. 
Even assuming, arguendo, this court disagreed and felt reversing the Utah court's 
order declining jurisdiction would not render California's judgment void or voidable, 
California's judgment is still not entitled to preclusive effect under the Federal Full Faith 
and Credit for Child Support Orders Act. The FFCC SO A governs which child support 
orders are entitled to full faith and credit, and which ones are open to collateral attack. 28 
U.S.C. § 1738B. 
Being an act of Congress, the FFCCSOA has conflict preemption over state law. 
The FFCCSOA states each state must enforce child support orders "made consistently 
with this section" by a court of another state. 28 U.S.C. § 1738B(a). Given the 
presumption Congress inserted the caveat "made consistently with this section" advisedly, 
See Verslus v. Guaranty Nat. Companies, 842 P.2d 865, 867 (Utah 1992), by negative 
implication a child support order made inconsistently with the FFCCSOA is not entitled 
to full faith and credit and is open to collateral attack. Cf. Curtis v. Curtis, 789 P.2d 717, 
722 (Utah App. 1990)(Context of PKPA). 
The FFCCSOA states a child support is made "consistently with this section" if (1) 
the court that makes the order, pursuant to the laws of the state in which the court is 
located and subsections (e), (f), and (g), ~ (A) has subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the 
matter and enter such an order ..." 28 U.S.C. § 1738B(c). A court of a State that has 
previously issued a support order has jurisdiction to modify its support order if that State 
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is still "the child's State or the residence of any individual contestant..." 28 U.S.C. § 
1738B(d). Although the FFCCSOA does not define "residence/' California has construed 
this exact same language in the UIFSA as synonymous with "domicile," and has held that 
military service-members stationed in California are not domiciled in California. 
Amezquita, 124 CaLRptr.2d 887; accord Basileh, 890 N.E.2d at 784-88 ("Residence" in 
FFCCSOA means domicile) affd in part and vacated in part on other grounds 912 
N.E.2d 814 fn 1 (Ind. 2009); See also Tucker, 277 Cal.Rptr. 403 (Fact soldier is deployed 
to California; sued for divorce by wife in California; and consents to California divorce 
does not give the soldier a California domicile). 
Consequently, the only way for California to assert jurisdiction to modify child 
support is to make a specific finding that Husband had a California domicile. However, 
the judgment and transcript of the California court's September 30, 2008, proceeding are 
devoid of this requisite factual finding. The California court piade no inquiry into where 
Husband was domiciled - it simply based its decision on the irrelevant fact Husband 
made a "general appearance" in California and did not oppose Wife registering the Utah 
support order in California. However, neither of these findii^gs provide a basis for 
asserting jurisdiction under the FFCCSOA. 
This court confronted a similar situation when a Mississippi court issued a final 
custody order based on the erroneous belief it had subject-matter jurisdiction because the 
appellant made a "general appearance" in Mississippi. Curtis v. Curtis, 789 P.2d 717, 
718-20 (Utah App. 1990). Applying the FFCCSOA's custody counterpart, the PKPA, 28 
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U.S.C. § 1738A, this court held, as a matter of federal law, Mississippi's order was void 
because federal law did not permit it to assert subject-matter jurisdiction using the 
personal jurisdiction doctrine of "general appearance." Id. at 720-726. This court 
correctly noted that while a "general appearance" in a foreign court waives any objection 
to personal jurisdiction, it does not confer subject-matter jurisdiction on that court. Id. at 
725-26. Consequently, Mississippi's final custody order was invalid as a matter of federal 
law under the PKPA. Id. 
Like the PKPA applied in Curtis, nothing in the plain language of the FFCCSOA 
allows California, as a matter of federal law, to assert subject-matter jurisdiction simply 
because Husband made a general appearance in California and did not oppose Wife 
registering the Utah child support order in California. In the absence of a specific finding 
that Husband was a California domiciliary, there was no statutory basis for California to 
assert subject-matter jurisdiction consistent with the FFCCSOA. Consequently, 
California's September 30, 2008, judgment is void for want of jurisdiction as a matter of 
federal law and not entitled to any preclusive effect. 
C. PRECLUSION DOES NOT BAR THIS COURT FROM CONSIDERING 
WHETHER IT WAS ERROR TO AWARD ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
Finally, even assuming, arguendo, this court held California's subsequent 
judgment made in reliance on the erroneous decision of the court below was entitled to 
preclusion regardless of how erroneous the predicate decision was, this does not impede 
this court from reviewing whether the court below exceeded its discretion by awarding 
attorney's fees based on a flawed interpretation of Utah law before California issued its 
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subsequent ruling. Cf. Searle v. Searle, 2001 UT App 367? f 13, 38 P.3d 307 {citing Lund, 
2000 UT 75 at Tf 9). If the court below awarded attorneys fees because it misconstrued 
Utah law then its decision was still a per se abuse of discretion because a California trial 
court does not have the power to bind how this court interprets Utah law. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF REQUESTED 
For the foregoing reasons, Husband asks this court for the following precise relief: 
(1) To hold that the term "residence" refers to legal residence in the context of the 
Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA); 
(2) To hold that Utah military service-members, like Husband, who are physically 
absent from Utah because of military service presumptively retain their legal 
residence in Utah absent clear and convincing proof that they have established a 
legal residence elsewhere during the course of their deployment; 
(3) To hold that Utah acquired subject-matter jurisdiction over this matter under Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 78B-14-205 and 78B-14-613 once Wife left California because now 
both parents and their child legally reside in Utah; 
(4) To reverse the lower court's judgment dismissing Husband's Amended Petition to 
modify child support and remanding this case back to the trial court for further 
proceedings; 
(5) To hold that California's September 30, 2008, order is void on its face and not 
entitled to preclusive effect because it is premised on a now vacated Utah 
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judgment, inconsistent with the FFCCSSOA, and California delegated the 
authority to decide which state should exercise jurisdiction to Utah. In the 
alternative, to grant Husband sixty (60) days to petition the California court to 
vacate or stay its September 30, 2008, order based on this court's reversal of the 
Utah court's decision declining jurisdiction in the first place; and 
(6) To reverse the Utah District Court's judgments awarding attorney's fees and costs 
to Wife in their entirety. 
Respectfully submitted this [£_ day of February, 2010. 
Mark Wiser, Esq. 
Counsel for Appellant Aaron Lilly 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on this }*> day of February, 2010,1 caused two (2) copies of 
Appellant's Brief and Appendix to be sent to the following parties via first-class 
United States Mail, postage prepaid: 
David R. Blaisdell, Esq. 
Counsel for Appellee Korilee Lilly 
5995 So. Redwood Rd. 
Salt Lake City, UT 84123
 y 
Mark Wiser, Counsel for Appellant 
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APPENDIX 
1. Order Dismissing Amended Petition to Modify, dated October 20, 2009. 
2. Minute Entry denying Appellant's objections to the Domestic Relations 
Commissioner's recommendation awarding attorney's fees and costs to Petitioner, 
dated December 9, 2008. 
3. Order Awarding Attorneys Fees to Petitioner dated November 3, 2008. 
4. Minute Entry denying Appellant's objections to the Domestic Relations 
Commissioner's recommendation on the question of whether the UIFSA looks to 
legal or physical residence, dated October 28, 2008. 
5. Order from September 17, 2008, hearing before the Domestic Relations 
Commissioner, dated October 1, 2008. 
6. Unpublished decision ofBlock v. Block, 2005 WL 89472, 2005 Minn.App. LEXIS 
26 (Minn.App. Jan 18, 2005). 
7. Unpublished decision of Grimes v. McFarland, 2003 WL 21787030 (Tex.App-
Hous. 14th Dist). 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL. DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH 
KOR1LEE LILLY 
Petitioner, 
v. 
AARON M. LILLY, 
Respondent. 
ORDER DISMISSING AMENDED 
PETITION TO MODIFY 
Case No.: 074904948 
Judge: Glenn K. Iwasaki 
Commissioner: T. Patrick Casey 
Petitioner Korilee Lilly's Motions for summary judgment jand additional attorney's fees, 
along with Respondent Aaron Lilly's opposition thereto, came before this Court for a hearing on 
August 26,2009, the Honorable Commissioner T. Patrick Casey presiding. 
Petitioner was represented by counsel, David Blaisdell. Respondent was represented by 
counsel, Mark Wiser. 
After reviewing the briefs and exhibits submitted by the parties, hearing oral argument, 
and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, the Commissibncr made various 
recommendations concerning matters in dispute. 
Wherefore, it is hereby the order of this Court as follows: 
I. Respondent's Amended Petition to Modify Child Support is hereby dismissed without 
prejudice pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) of the Rules of Civp Procedure. 
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2. This Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to consider Respondent's request to modify 
child support under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (Utah Code Ann. § 78B-
14 et seq ) because the parties' original child support order was issued in California and 
Respondent Aaron Lilly still physically lives in California. Petitioner has also not filed a 
writing consenting to this Court assuming jurisdiction over this matter, 
3. This Court interprets the UIFSA's use of the terms ^residence" and "resides" to mean 
which state a parent physically lives in a&-eppo$edHe-wtoeh-sto^ ryf 
j£skte£fow4ias^^ 
4. This Court has not made any findings of fact on the question of whether Respondent 
remains domiciled in Utah or whether he acquired a California domicile during the course 
of his military deployment there. Consequently, if the appellate court reverses this Court's 
judgment and holds that the UIFSA looks to legal residence as opposed to physical 
residence, an evidentiary hearing will probably be necessary on remand to determine 
which state Respondent legally resides in. 
5. Petitioner's Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED because it became moot after the 
ruling on the Motion for Clarification. Nevertheless, if this Court's judgment is reversed 
on appeal then Petitioner may renew her motion on remand. 
6. Petitioner's Motion for attorney's fees is DENIED on the basis this Court's grant of 
Respondent's Motion for clarification made Petitioner's opposition thereto and subsequent 
motion for summary judgment unnecessary. Nevertheless, the issue of attorney fees is reserved if 
the appellate court remands this matter. 
7. This is the final order and judgment of this Court disposing of this matter as to all claims, 
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all parties, and the issue of attorney's fees and costs. 
DATED this*? day s  of 
BY THE COURT 
2009. 
The Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
DATED this / £ day of j ^ • 0-'i:k- .., 2009. 
RECOMMENDEp&Y: ^ 
•J i !'< M 
-+-The Honorable T. Patrick Casey 
DISTRICT CJOURT COMMISSIONER 
DATED this __ day of
 m - / 
Approved aslto form: 
j 2009. 
David R. Blaisdell, Esq. 
Counsel for the Petitioner 
NOT ICE TO ALL PARTIES 
Pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 7(f)(2), this proposed Order will be filed with the Court five 
days after service upon you. Your objections, if any, must be filed with the Court within five 
davs after service. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KORILEE LILLY : 
: MINUTE ENTRY 
Plaintiff : 
: Case No. 074904948 
-vs- : 
: JUDGE GLENN K. IWASAKI 
AARON M. LI-JLY : 
: Date: DECEMBER 9, 2008 
Defendant : 
The Court has reviewed the requests for decisions submitted 
by the part'es, Commissioner Casey's Minutes of September 17, 
2008 and October 22, 2008, this Court's Minute Entry of October 
28, 2008, Respondent's Partial Objection to Commissioner Casey's 
Recommendat .on of October 22, 2008 re: fees; Respondent's Motion 
to Alter or Amend this Court's Minute Entry of October 28, 2C08, 
all supporting and opposition memos and rules as follows: 
As to the Motion to Alter or Amend, the Court denies the 
Motion to Alter or Amend It's Minute Entry of October 28, 2008 
which denied the objection to Commissioner Casey's 
Recommendation contained in the Minutes and subsequent order to 
the September 17, 2008 hearing. Also, the Court denies the 
Request for a "New Trial" or Oral Argument or Request to: a 
De Novo Hea -:i rig . 
MINUTE ENTRV
 PAGE 2 07490^948 
Reqard^ng the Respondent's Partial Objection to 
Commissioner Casey's Recommendation re: tees, the Cour^ finds 
that Commissioner Casey coriectly exeicsed his discrericn and 
did not commit error, as aLleged by respondent, m his 
recommendat' or:. 
This s gned Minute Entry will be th^ Order of the Ccurt on 
these issues. 
GKI/jmb 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
DAVID R. BLA1SDELL ^ 6 0 ^ J " " r ' a ! 0 is t ' jCt ^ £ / ) 
BLAISDELL & CHURCH. P.C.
 Mr,v .. ? ^nno 
r T . • - " * ' * •• £ ' J u O 
Attorneys lor Petitioner 
5995 South Redwood Road
 n **
Ll
 ^
K£ CUUNTY 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84123 E N T ^ E p i N P - * * ^ - - - _ _ ^ ^ ^ 
'lelephonc: (801) 261-3407 L r , ' \ \ f
 A i a 
DA1E ^ 04> \Q<r. 
IN I HE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRiC I COURT, IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAII 
KOR1LEE LILLY. 
ORDER AWARDING ATTORNEYS 
Petitioner. : FEES TO PETITIONER 
vs. 
Civil No. 074904948 
AARON MATTHEW LILLY, 
: Judge lwasaki 
Respondent. Commissioner ('asey 
Petitioner's Motion for Award of Attorneys Fees dated September 26lh, 2008 duly came for 
hearing before the above-entitled Court on October 22, 2008, at 9:00 a.m., the Honorable 
Commissioner T. Patrick Casey presiding. Petitioner appeared in person and through her counsel 
of record, David R. Blaisdcll and Respondent appeared through his counsel of record, Mark Wiser, 
but did not appear in person. The Motion was argued, submitted for ruling and the Court found that: 
1. There has been no bad faith and a good faith dispute exists between the parties. 
2. Both the provisions of the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act and 30-1-3, Utah Code 
Annotated are a predicate for the award of attorneys fees. 
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3. It is not appropriate to defer the award of attorneys lees pending appeal. 
4. It is not appropriate for Petitioner to attempt to enforqe the award of attorneys fees 
pending the ruling of Judge Iwasaki on Respondent's Objection to Commissioner's 
Recommendation. 
5. Petitioner is the prevailing party. 
6. The attorneys fees requested arc reasonable in amount and relevant to the issues herein. 
7. There is no evidence that Respondent is impecunious. 
8. There are no facts that indicate that the requested attorneys fees should not be awarded. 
Based upon the foregoing, and good cause appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: 
1. Petitioner's Motion for Award of Attorneys Fees is grantjed, 
2. Petitioner is awarded Judgment against Respondent in |the sum of $3,325.00 for her 
attorneys fees. 
3. The issue of Petitioner's attorneys fees arising in conjunction with Respondent's 
Objection to Commissioner's Recommendalion is reserved, to be determined by the Honorable 
Glenn K. Iwasaki in conjunction with such Objection. 
4. Pending the determination of the Objection to Commissioner's Recommendation, 
Petitioner shall take no steps to enforce this Order. 
DATED this 2 day of jO^U:_ , 2008. 
BY THE COURT: 
i 
JUDGE GLENN K. WAS 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KORILEE LILLY 
: MINUTE ENTRY 
Petitioner : 
: Case No. 074904948 
-vs- : 
JUDGE GLENN K. IWASAKI 
AARON M. LILLY ; 
: Date: OCTOBER 28, 2008 
Respondent : 
The Court has reviewed Commissioner Casey's Minutes of 
September l'?, 2008, Respondent's objections, Petitioner's 
response, Respondent's Motion to Strike, Petitioner's response, 
other relevant pleadings and denies the motion. 
As an initial matter, the Court denies the Motion to Strike 
and has considered Petitioner's objections. With that said, the 
Court does not find any abuse of discretion nor error in law as 
to Commissioner Casey's recommendations. 
The Court signed the submitted Recommendations and Order on 
October 1, 2008 and that will remain the order of the Court on 
these issuers. 
MINUTE ENTRY PAGE 2 C74904948 
D a t e d t h i s 2 8 t h day of O c t o b e r , 2 0 0 8 , 
GKI/jrnb 
316 
DAVID R. BLAISDELL #360 
BLAISDLLL & CHURCH. P.O. 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
5(W5 South Redwood Road 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84123 
Telephone: (801) 261-3407 
M I D DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
OCT - 1 2008 
SALT LAKE GOuuTV 
B y
— "f^puty Clerk" 
IN THL THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT. IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY. UTAH 
KORILEH LILLY. 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
AARON MATTHEW LILLY, 
Respondent. 
ORDER 
Civil No. 074904948 
Judge lwasaki 
Commissioner Casey 
Respondent's Motion to Determine Residency and Choice of Law duly came for hearing 
before the above-entitled Court on September 17.2008. at 9:00 a.m.. the Honorable T. Patrick Casey 
presiding. Petitioner appeared in person and through her counsel of record, David R. Blaisdell and 
Respondent appeared in person and through his counsel of record, Mark Wiser The Motion was 
argued, and the Court found that: 
1. Respondent dwells, maintains an abode, has a bodily presence and lives in the physical 
sense in the State of California; 
2. The parties maintained their marital residence in the State of California; 
1 
3. Both parties were residents of the State of California tor the purpose of invoking 
jurisdiction for their divorce; 
4. Respondent did not object to the exercise of jurisdiction of the parties' divorce hv the 
State of California, 
5. It is a fiction that Respondent lives in the State of Utah, and 
6. No additional evidence was presented that was not presented at the hearing on March 10. 
2008. at which time the Court ruled that this Coun docs not have jurisdiction to modify the 
California Judgment, without the written consent of each party; 
Based upon the foregoing, and good cause appearing. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: 
1. Respondent's Motion To Determine Residency and Choice of Law is denied. 
2. The State of Utah has no jurisdiction to modify the existing child support order contained 
in the Judgment of Dissolution entered in the State of California. 
3. The State of California retains exclusive jurisdiction to modify the existing child support 
order contained in the Judgment of Dissolution. 
4. The Court's prior Order dated March 26, 2008 remains in full force and effect. 
DATED this l_ day of JjC^ , 2008. /*v; x BY THE COURT: / ' ->-vv . * 
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This opinion will be unpublished and 
may not be cited except as provided by 
Minn. Stat § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2002). 
STATE OF MINNESOTA 
IN COURT OF APPEALS 
A04-942 
In re Darren Arnold Block, petitioner, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
Melissa Kay Block 
n/k/a Melissa Kay Holmberg, 
Respondent. 
Filed January 18, 2005 
Reversed 
Hudson, Judge 
Dodge County District Court 
File No. FX-03-293 
George F. Restovich, Bruce K. Piotrowski, Cieorge F. Restovich & Associates, 117 East Center 
Street, Rochester, Minnesota 55904 (for appellant) 
Michael J. Corbin, Corbin Law Office, 300 Depot Square Building, 303 Northeast First 
Avenue, Faribault, Minnesota 55021 (for respondent) 
Considered and decided by Peterson, Presiding Judge; Willis, Judge; and Hudson, Judge. 
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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N 
HUDSON, Judge 
Respondent registered a Texas child-support decree in Minnesota, and the district court 
modified appellant's child-support obligation. Appellant argues on appeal that the district court 
lacked subject matter jurisdiction to modify the Texas decree under the Uniform Interstate Family 
Support Act. Because the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to modify the Texas 
decree, we reverse. 
FACTS 
The parties married in Minnesota. Both parties were domiciled in Minnesota at the 
time of their marriage. Appellant entered the United States armed forces shortly thereafter and 
was transferred to a military base in Texas. The parties' marriage was dissolved by final decree 
on April 17, 2000, in Coryell County, Texas. The Texas court found that it had jurisdiction 
over the dissolution because appellant was domiciled in Texas at the time of filing. Pursuant to 
the dissolution, the Texas court ordered appellant to pay regular monthly child support. The 
decree further authorized respondent to leave the jurisdiction and establish a primary residence 
for the parties' children. Respondent returned to Minnesota with the parties' children and 
established their domicile in Dodge County. The Army stationed appellant in South Korea, but 
appellant maintained a home in Texas. 
In April 2003, respondent registered the Texas decree in Dodge County, Minnesota. 
Respondent moved to modify appellant's child-support obligation in Dodge County in June 2003, 
requesting that the district court assume subject matter jurisdiction. Appellant remained stationed 
in South Korea at the time of respondent's motion. The district court held a hearing on August 
19, 2003. Appellant challenged the district court's subject matter jurisdiction under the Uniform 
Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA), Minn. Stat. ch. 518C (2002). The district court agreed to 
assume jurisdiction and granted respondent's motion to modify the Texas child-support order on 
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December 16, 2003. Appellant moved for a new trial or amended findings. The district court 
upheld its December 16, 2003 order modifying appellant's child-support obligation on April 29, 
2004. This appeal follows. 
D E C I S I O N 
Questions of subject matter jurisdiction are reviewed de novo. Johnson v. Murray, 648 
N.W.2d 664, 670 (Minn. 2002). Because subject matter jurisdiction goes to a court's authority 
to preside over a matter, an appellant may raise the lack of subject matter jurisdiction for the 
first time on appeal. Cochrane v. Tudor Oaks Condo. Project, 529 N.W.2d 429, 432 (Minn. 
App. 1995) (citing Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.08(c)), review denied (Minn. May 31, 1995). "An 
appellate court will determine jurisdictional facts on its own motion even though neither party 
has raised the issue." Carlson v. Cherrnak, 639 N.W.2d 886, 889 (Minn. App. 2002). If this 
court determines that a district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over a matter on appeal, 
it must dismiss the action. Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.08(c). 
Appellant argues that the district court improperly assumed subject matter jurisdiction 
over the Texas child-support order under the UIFSA. Minnesota and Texas have both adopted 
the UIFSA. See Minn. Stat. §§ 518C.101~518C.902 (2002); Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 
159.001-159.902 (2002). When applying and construing a state's codification of the UIFSA, 
courts must give consideration to the need to promote uniformity in the law with respect to 
other states adopting similar provisions. See Minn. Stat. §§ 518C.901, 645.22 (2002); Tex. 
Fam. Code Ann. § 159.901 (2002). Under section 205 of the UIFSA, as codified in Texas, 
Texas courts retain continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify a child-support order issued in 
Texas 
(1) as long as this state remains the residence of the obligor, the 
individual obligee, or the child for whose benefit the support order 
is issued; or 
(2) until all of the parties who are individuals have filed written 
consents with the tribunal of this state for a tribunal of another state 
to modify the order and assume continuing, exclusive jurisdiction. 
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Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 159.205(a) (2002); see also Minn. Stat. § 518C.205(a) (2002) 
(providing a similar statement of law applicable to child-support orders issued by Minnesota 
courts). 
A Minnesota court may modify a foreign child-support order if the order has been 
registered in Minnesota and, after notice and a hearing, the registering court finds that: 
(i) the child, the individual obligee, and the obligor do not reside in 
the issuing state; 
(ii) a petitioner who is a nonresident of this state sefeks modification; 
and 
(iii) the respondent is subject to the personal jurisdiction of the 
tribunal of this state. 
Minn. Stat. § 518C.611(a)(1) (2002). Additionally, a Minnesota court can assume jurisdiction to 
modify the Texas order if both parents are residents of Minnesota and the child no longer lives in 
Texas. See Minn. Stat. § 518C.613(a) (2002). And finally, a Minnesota court may modify a 
foreign child-support order if 
the child, or a party who is an individual, is subject to the personal 
jurisdiction of the tribunal of this state and all of the parties who are 
individuals have filed written consents in the issuing tribunal for a 
tribunal of this state to modify the support order and assume 
continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over the order. However, if the 
issuing state is a foreign jurisdiction that has not enacted a law or 
established procedures substantially similar to the procedures in this 
chapter, the consent otherwise required of an individual residing in 
this state is not required for the tribunal to assume jurisdiction to 
modify the child support order. 
Minn. Stat. § 518C.611(a)(2) (2002). 
Accordingly, unless the circumstances at hand satisfy one of the above three criteria, 
Texas retains exclusive jurisdiction over the Texas child-support order, and we must vacate the 
district court's orders for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 
The district court does not have jurisdiction to modify the Texas child-support order 
under either Minn. Stat. § 518C.611(a)(1) or Minn. Stat. § 518C.613(a) because the parties do 
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not satisfy the residency requirements. Respondent, a Minnesota resident, is the petitioner 
seeking modification in Minnesota. Under section 518C.611(a)(1), the district court lacks 
jurisdiction if the petitioner resides in Minnesota. See Porro v. Porro, 675 N.W.2d 82, 87 
(Minn. App. 2004) (holding that the requirements for jurisdiction under section 518C.611(a) 
(l)(ii) were not met where the mother was a Minnesota resident). Further, because appellant 
is not a Minnesota resident, the district court cannot exercise jurisdiction under section 
518C.613(a).^ 
Respondent argues that Minnesota courts have subject matter jurisdiction over the 
Texas child-support order under Minn. Stat. § 518C.611(a)(2) because appellant did not 
present evidence at the district court level of Texas's conformity with the UIFSA. Under 
section 518C.611(a)(2), if Texas has not codified the UIFSA, or some other similar provision, 
Minnesota courts may assume jurisdiction over the Texas order without obtaining appellant's 
consent. Respondent's argument fails because it misconstrues this court's scope of review over 
the district court's subject matter jurisdiction. Subject matter jurisdiction is an issue that can be 
raised for the first time on appeal. Cochrane, 529 N.W.2d at 432 (citing Minn. R. Civ. P. 
12.08(c)). And this court may take judicial notice of Texas's status as a signatory. See Minn. 
R. Evid. 201(b). Accordingly, because Texas is a signatory to the UIFSA, Minnesota courts do 
not have jurisdiction to modify the Texas child-support order under Minn. Stat. § 
518C.611(a)(2) without the consent of the parties. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 
159.001-159.902. 
Respondent next argues that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction under 
Minn. Stat. § 518C.611(a)(2) because this provision is unique to Minnesota. Texas's 
codification of the UIFSA does not contain a similar jurisdiction-granting provision and, 
therefore, respondent contends that Texas's codification is not "substantially similar" to the 
Minnesota statutes. We disagree. Respondent's argument isolates one subpart of a section in 
the Minnesota codification of the UIFSA and ignores the similarity between the rest of Minn. 
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Stat. §§ 518C.101-518C.902 and Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 159.001-159.902. The Texas 
UIFSA is substantially similar to the Minnesota codification. Consequently, the district court 
does not have subject matter jurisdiction under section 518.611(a)(2) unless appellant files a 
written consent. 
Finally, respondent argues that the Minnesota court had ancillary subject matter 
jurisdiction to modify the Texas child-support order under the UIFSA because the Minnesota 
court had subject matter jurisdiction for purposes of custody modification under Minnesota's 
codification of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA). See 
Minn. Stat. §§ 518D.101-518D.317 (2002). Assuming that Minnesota had and exercised 
subject matter jurisdiction over the custody provisions of the Texas order under the UCCJEA, 
respondent's argument is without merit. Any application of the ancillary jurisdiction doctrine to 
the UIFSA would defeat its explicit requirement of one state with exclusive jurisdiction, and its 
purpose of imposing uniformity. See Minn. Stat. § 645.22; National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, UIFSA (2001) Prefatory Note II.B.3 (noting that the 
UIFSA was meant to ensure that "only one valid support order may be effective at any one 
time/' even though the parties and their children may leave the issuing state). Moreover, the 
two Minnesota cases addressing jurisdiction under the UIFSA and UCCJEA analyze the 
jurisdictional requirements separately without invoking ancillary jurisdiction. See Schroeder v. 
Schroeder, 658 N.W.2d 909, 912-13 (Minn. App. 2003); Stone v. Stone, 636 N.W.2d 594, 
596-97 (Minn. App. 2001). Accordingly, the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to 
modify the Texas child-support order under the UIFSA. 
Reversed. 
m Although respondent's status as a Minnesota resident disposes of the jurisdictional issue 
under section 518C.611(a)(1), the parties devoted considerable argument to defining 
"residence" under the UIFSA. The terms "residence" and "domicile" are frequently used 
interchangeably by our legislature, particularly in the area of family law. See Minn. Stat. § 
518.003, subd. 2 (2002) (defining "residence" to mean "the place where a party has 
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established a permanent home from which the party has no present intention of moving"). The 
UIFSA gives one state continuing exclusive jurisdiction over child-support matters. An 
individual therefore cannot have more than one residence. Thus, "residence" for purposes of 
the UIFSA means domicile. 
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Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed August 5, 2003. 
In The 
Fourteenth Court of Appeals 
NO. 14-02-00875-CV 
WILBUR KEITH GRIMES, Appellant 
V. 
LOIS ANN McFARLAND, Appellee 
On Appeal from the 311th District Court 
Harris County, Texas 
Trial Court Cause No. 01-19454 
M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N 
Appellant, Wilbur Grimes, appeals the dismissal of his motion to modify child support 
and the special appearance granted to appellee, Lois McFarland. In a single issue, appellant 
contends the trial court erred in dismissing his motion to modify child support for lack of 
jurisdiction. We affirm. 
FACTS 
McFarland and Grimes divorced after Grimes was indicted for sexually assaulting their 
minor, female child. On May 5, 2001, they signed an Agreed Final Decree of Divorce. On the 
same day, McFarland and the child moved to Kansas. The trial court then signed and entered 
the divorce decree on June 18, 2001. McFarland traveled from Kansas to appear for the 
uncontested June divorce hearing. Grimes traveled to Tennessee, although there were several 
outstanding warrants for his arrest in Texas. While in Tennessee, on November 26, 2001, 
Grimes filed a Motion to Modify the Parent-Child Relationship in Harris County, contesting child 
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support and custody. He never served McFarland with a copy of his motion. Thereafter, while 
confined within a Texas jail, Grimes amended his motion and served McFarland in Kansas on 
January 28, 2002. 
On February 26, 2002, McFarland filed a special appearance and her answer, alleging 
that she lived in Kansas, had no contact with Texas, and Grimes was now a resident of 
Tennessee. An evidentiary hearing before an associate judge was held on April 5, 2002. At the 
hearing, McFarland agreed to abate Grimes's obligation to pay child support during the pendency 
of the criminal case. The judge sustained her special appearance as to child support only. 
However, Grimes appealed the associate judge's ruling and requested a hearing de novo on all 
special appearance issues. On May 2, 2002, following a hearing before the presiding judge of 
the 311th District Court, McFarland's special appearance was sustained. The court, inter alia, 
rendered the following Finding of Fact: "neither the child (CKG) nor either of (her) parents 
presently reside in the State of Texas or have a significant connection with the State of Texas." 
The court also rendered the following Conclusion of Law: "this court has no personal or subject 
matter jurisdiction." The court issued an order ruling that it did not have jurisdiction or, in the 
alternative, declining to exercise jurisdiction under section 152.28 of the Family Code. 
In four sub-issues appellant argues that (1) appellee waived her special appearance; (2) 
under the Family Code, Texas retained exclusive jurisdiction; (3) he was a resident and 
domiciliary of Texas; and (4) appellee was barred from "going behind" the divorce decree. 
WAIVER 
During the April 5, 2002 special appearance hearing before an associate judge, 
McFarland asked the court to enter temporary orders abating Grimes's child support obligations. 
In one of his sub-issues, Grimes contends that McFarland waived her special appearance when 
she agreed that he was not obligated to pay child support during the pendency of his aggravated 
sexual assault case. Generally, a party waives a special appearance if it seeks affirmative relief 
or invokes the trial court's jurisdiction on any question other than the court's jurisdiction before 
the trial court rules on the special appearance. Dawson-Austin v. Austin, 968 S.W.2d 319, 322 
(Tex. 1998). In this case, however, the court had already ruled on the special appearance. The 
associate judge ruled that Kansas had jurisdiction over the custody issue and that Texas would 
retain jurisdiction over all support issues. Based on the court's ruling, and still subject to her 
special appearance, McFarland then asked to abate Grimes's child support obligations pending 
final disposition of his criminal case. Because the court ruled on the special appearance before 
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McFarland offered or agreed to abate child support payments, we find she did not waive her 
special appearance. Id. 
SPECIAL APPEARANCE 
In Grimes's remaining sub-issues, he challenges the trial court's decision to grant 
m 
McFarland's special appearance. When the trial court enters findings of fact and conclusions 
of law following the grant of a special appearance, we review findings of fact for sufficiency of 
the evidence and conclusions of law de novo. See Linton v. Airbus Industrie, 934 S.W.2d '754, 
757 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, writ denied). In conducting our review, we 
consider all of the evidence that was before the trial court, including the pleadings, any 
stipulations, affidavits and exhibits, the results of discovery, and any oral testimony. BHP de 
Venezuela, CA. v. Casteig, 994 S.W.2d 321, 326 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1999, pet. denied) 
(op. on reh'g). 
A. Residency of McFarland and the Child 
The Uniform Interstate Family Support Act O'UIFSA") addresses jurisdiction between 
competing states involving matters of child support. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 152.001 -
159.902 (Vernon Supp. 2001). UIFSA provides: 
(a) A tribunal of this state issuing a support order consistent with the 
law of this state has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over a child 
support order: 
(1) as long as this state remains the residence of the 
obligor, the individual obligee, or the child for whose 
benefit the support order is issued 
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 159.205(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2001). 
Under UIFSA, the trial court retains jurisdiction if either the child, McFarland, or Grimes 
remained a resident of Texas. During the special appearance hearing, McFarland testified she 
and the child moved to Kansas in May 2001, after she signed the Agreed Divorce Decree. She 
returned to Texas only once, in June 2001, to prove up the uncontested divorce. There was also 
testimony that the child had firmly established relationships with physicians, counselors, and her 
school. According to McFarland's testimony, she and the child did not have any contact with 
Texas after June 2001. This evidence was undisputed, and Grimes has not challenged any of the 
121 
trial court's findings of fact regarding their residency. Unchallenged findings of fact are 
binding on the appellate court unless the contrary is established as a matter of law or there is no 
evidence to support the trial court's findings. See London v. London, 94 S.W.3d 139, 149 (Tex. 
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App — Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.). Because Grimes made no challenge to the trial 
court's findings regarding McFarland's and the child's residency, we are bound by those 
findings. Id. Therefore, we need only review the challenged findings as to Grimes's residency. 
B. Residency of Grimes 
Grimes is currently serving a twenty-two year prison sentence in Texas. He filed his 
amended Motion to Modify while incarcerated in Harris County. Section 159 of the Family 
Code does not define residency; however, residency has been defined in other family law 
contexts. For example, a requirement to file for divorce under Chapter 6 of the Family Code, is 
residency in the county in which suit is filed for the preceding 90-day period. TEX. FAM. 
CODE ANN. § 6.301 (Vernon Supp. 2003). In that context, residency has been defined as 
physical presence in a county, accompanied by good faith intent to remain permanently and 
definitely make that county one's home. Randle v. Randle, 178 S.W.2d 570, 572 (Tex. Civ. 
App.—Galveston 1944, no writ); see also Vickery v. Comm'nfor Lawyer Discipline, 5 S.W.3d 
241, 262 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. denied). Further, there is no reason an 
inmate cannot file for divorce in the county where he is imprisoned; but he must intend to reside 
in that county permanently after his release from prison. In re Marriage ofEarin, 519 S.W.2d 
892, 893 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston [1st Dist] 1975, no writ). By analogy, for Texas to be a 
state of residence, a party should have actual, physical presence in the state coupled with a good 
faith intent to make Texas home. For an inmate to establish residency in Texas, he or she must 
intend in good faith to reside here permanently after release from prison. 
In this case, the trial court entered findings of fact that Grimes was a resident of Texas 
only while involuntarily incarcerated and that when he had the freedom to choose where to 
reside, it was not Texas. The evidence shows that Grimes physically lived in Memphis, 
Tennessee with his sister after leaving Texas in September 2001. He left Tennessee in December 
2001 and turned himself in at the Harris County jail. Upon posting bond, he immediately 
returned to Tennessee. Grimes filed his Motion to Modify from Tennessee. Finally, he advised 
the Harris County Criminal Court that he no longer resided in Texas. We will reverse the trial 
court's findings for factual insufficiency only where they are "so against the great weight and 
preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly erroneous or unjust." Cartlidge v. 
Hernandez, 9 S.W.3d 341, 346 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (citing In re 
King's Estate, 150 Tex. 662, 244 S.W.2d 660, 661 (1951)). We have reviewed the record, and 
we find there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding that Grimes was not a 
resident of Texas. 
CONCLUSION 
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Because Grimes did not challenge the findings as to the residence of the child and 
McFarland; and because there is sufficient evidence supporting the trial court's finding that Texas 
was not Grimes's place of residence, we hold that the trial court did not err in granting the 
special appearance. Accordingly, we overrule Grimes's single issue and affirm the trial court's 
order. 
/s/ Charles W. Seymore 
Justice 
Judgment rendered and Memorandum Opinion filed August 5, 2003. 
Panel consists of Justices Anderson, Seymore, and Guzman. 
Grimes has limited his appeal to the special appearance granted on the child support issue. 
[2] 
Grimes contends McFarland is collaterally estopped from denying her Texas residency because of 
averments in the divorce decree. To the extent such an argument is a challenge to the trial court's findings, it is 
only a challenge up to the date of divorce. It does not cover findings of residency after the date of divorce. 
Further, collateral estoppel is an affirmative defense that must be pleaded or it is waived. TEX. R. CIV. P. 94. 
Because Grimes failed to plead collateral estoppel, he waived the issue on appeal. 
